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Abstract: The rapid rise of India and China as innovating nations seems 
to contradict conventional views of the economic growth and development 
process.  India and China are still at the early stages of development, yet advanced 
nations are granting rapidly growing numbers of patents to inventors based in 
these countries. Our analysis of U.S. patents shows that a majority of these  
patents are granted to local inventor teams working for foreign multinationals. An 
important fraction of these patents incorporate direct intellectual inputs from 
researchers outside India or China, a trend that we characterize as "international 
co-invention." As such, the international patenting surge of India and China does 
not represent a challenge to traditional models of growth and development, so 
much as it represents a move toward an expanded international division of labor 
within global R&D networks. We explore these issues with a focus on 
multinational R&D in India. 
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I. Introduction 
For decades, international economists and development economists have 
worked with models that posit a kind of ladder of economic development.  
Countries begin the development process as largely agricultural economies.  As 
they accumulate skill, capital, and technology, economies move into more 
complex manufacturing and service activities. Finally, after decades of 
development and steady increases in income, countries begin to create new-to-
the-world technology.  However, this is something that emerges at the end of the 
development process in the standard models (Vernon 1966; Krugman 1979; 
Grossman and Helpman 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991).  
Despite many years of impressive growth, China, and especially India, are 
still in the early stages of the conventional development process -- this is 
evidenced by their still low levels of per capita output and income.  China and 
India lag far behind the industrial West, of course, but they also lag behind other 
developing countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, and Malaysia.  However, India 
and China are already innovating, as is evidenced by the rapidly rising number of 
patents granted by the U.S. and European patent offices to inventors residing in 
India and China.  While the absolute number of patents remains low, the rates of 
growth have been exponential.  Rapidly growing number of patent counts are not 
the only indicator of rising innovation in these emerging markets; India and China 
are also hosting an expanding number of R&D centers sponsored by the world’s 
technologically elite firms (Basant and Mani 2012; Freeman 2006). Does this 
trend contradict conventional wisdom? Should we abandon our conventional 
economic models, or at least presume that they may not apply to these dynamic 
Asian giants?  Respected experts in international economics have suggested as 
much, calling upon advocates of more traditional models to “wake up and smell 
the ginseng” (Puga and Trefler 2010)!  The growing role of emerging economies 
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in global innovation has also raised significant concerns among leaders in 
government, industry, and academia in the industrial West.  Is the recent growth 
in emerging economies’ R&D activity undermining the traditional position of 
technological leadership enjoyed by the U.S. and other advanced industrial 
economies? 
Using U.S. patent data, we examine the innovative explosions in India and 
China. We trace the dramatic growth of U.S. patents received by inventors 
residing in India and China across time, technological fields, organizational 
boundaries, and geographic space. We examine the quality of patents, as 
evidenced by patent citations, with a focus in this paper on activity in India. By 
doing so, we are able to reveal some of the facts, perceptions, and insights 
associated with rising innovation in these emerging economies. 
We make two contributions to the literature. First, we find that the rapid 
growth in U.S. patents awarded to private sector inventors based in India and 
China are driven, to a great extent, by multinational corporations (MNCs) from 
advanced industrial economies and are highly dependent on collaborations 
between local inventors and other inventors in advanced economies.1 Therefore, 
India and China’s striking innovation surge may represent less of a challenge to 
conventional models of trade, economic growth, and development  than it appears 
at first glance. The view that the increases in innovation in India and China are 
undermining the traditional position of technological leadership enjoyed by the 
U.S. and other advanced industrial economies might therefore also be 
exaggerated.  
Second, we find evidence of an increasing trend of an international 
division of R&D labor—or, phrased differently, a vertical distintegration of R&D, 
 
1
   While Chen, Jang, and Chang (2013) and Jang, Wang, and Chen (2012) have shown the importance of international 
co-invention in the context of invention in certain emerging markets, we go well beyond this by examining all 
multinational patents and by comparing the quality of multinational and indigenous patents. 
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with various stages of the R&D process now being conducted in different 
locations around the world. The general phenonmenon of a vertical disintegration 
of manufacturing has been studied in the international economics literature (e.g. 
Yi 2003; Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001; Krugman, Cooper and Srinivasan 1995).  
We find conceptually similar changes in R&D. As the innovation networks of 
MNCs span the globe, emerging economies like India and China that possess both 
a huge scientific and engineering talent pool and large markets, have become an 
important part of these global innovation networks. By undertaking R&D in 
emerging economies, MNCs can now provide innovative technologies to global 
markets at a lower cost, and introduce products more suitable for local and other 
emerging markets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the 
background of the rise of innovation in India and China and briefly explains why 
the existing theory of vertical disintegration may explain the rise of innovation in 
these two economies. Section III describes our data and presents descriptive 
features of the rise of innovation in India and China as suggested by the data. 
Section IV presents empirical models and detailed regression results focusing on 
patent quality as well as quantity. Section IV provides insights from a field study 
of MNC R&D activity in these emerging markets. Section VI and discusses 
policy implications and presents our conclusions. 
II. Background  
Industrial R&D activity within the borders of mainland China has 
increased at a very rapid pace over the last fifteen years, and has now reached 
levels that are quite impressive by the standards of developing economies. It is 
also one of the favorite destinations for multinational R&D investment. Over the 
1997–2007 period, the total amount of U.S. multinational R&D spending 
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increased 33-fold in China, from 35 million to 1.17 billion U.S. dollars.2 The 
growth of R&D in India has been slower. Its R&D intensity was 0.76% of GDP in 
2007, essentially unchanged since 2000 (OECD 2012).  Nevertheless, the total 
amount of U.S. multinational R&D spending increased 16-fold in India, from 22 
million to 382 million U.S. dollars over the 1997–2007 period.2 
Tracking patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to inventors residing in India and China provides another useful way of 
measuring the expansion of R&D within these countries.3 Anyone seeking to 
protect intellectual property within the borders of the U.S. must apply for patent 
protection from the USPTO. Given the importance of the U.S. economy to the 
world in general, it is reasonable to regard patents taken out in the U.S. by 
inventors residing in India and China as a useful indicator of innovative activity 
there.4  
Figure 1 shows the annual number of U.S. utility patent grants with at 
least one inventor residing in India. We can see that U.S. patents granted to 
Indian inventors grew rapidly. Over the 1996–2010 period, the total number of 
U.S. patents granted to Indian inventors increased 25-fold.  Figure 2 presents the 
annual number of U.S. utility patent grants with at least one inventor residing in 
China from 1981 to 2010. One can clearly see that the number of U.S. patents 
 
2
 The number is for majority-owned affiliates of nonbank U.S. parent companies in India or China. A "Majority-Owned 
Affiliate" is an Indian or Chinese affiliate in which the combined direct and indirect ownership interest of all U.S. parents 
exceeds 50%. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Multinational Companies, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=2&step=1, 
retrieved on August 8, 2012. 
3
  After we had produced the first draft of this paper, we discovered that Chen, Jang, and Chang (2013) had used 
USPTO data to examine R&D cooperation between Chinese and foreign inventors and Jang, Wang, and Chen (2012) used 
USPTO data to compare this activity in India and China.  While there is some overlap between the purely descriptive parts 
of their papers and our work here, there are also important differences.  Our paper considers both co-invention and 
multinational sponsorship of indigenous inventor teams, whereas they consider only the former.  The econometric 
approach taken by these two papers differs entirely from ours.  In particular, we focus on patent quality as revealed by 
patent citations, whereas their work does not.   
4 U.S. patents have been used to measure inventive output in Britain (Griffith, Harrison, and Reenen 2006), Japan 
(Branstetter and Sakakibara 2002), and Israel (Trajtenberg 2001). At the same time, we recognize that the use of U.S. 
patents as an indicator of inventive output of another country poses potential problems, and we include a discussion of 
these later in the paper. 
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granted to Chinese inventors exploded in recent years. Over the 1996–2010 
period, the total number of U.S. patents granted to Chinese inventors increased 
46-fold. A similar explosion can be observed using Chinese domestic patent data 
(Hu and Jefferson 2009). Over the 2000–2009 period, the total number of 
invention patents granted by the State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C 
(SIPO) increased 20-fold. 5, 6 
Using U.S. patent data, one can further disaggregate patents generated in 
India and China into ones in which all listed inventors at the time of invention 
were based in those regions; ones which were created by international teams of 
inventors; and patents generated by inventors residing in India and China but 
owned by MNCs. Over 90 percent of U.S. patents granted to American inventors 
are generated by teams of inventors in which every inventor is residing in the U.S. 
at the time of application. The same is true of U.S. patents granted to Japanese 
inventors where over 90 percent of such patents are generated by exclusively 
Japanese inventor teams.7 However, this is not true of patents being generated in 
India and China. A large and growing fraction of patents with Indian or Chinese 
inventors result from something we call international co-invention—teams of 
researchers based in different countries combining their skills and knowledge to 
generate patented inventions.8  In addition, a growing fraction of the patents 
produced by purely Indian or Chinese inventor teams is created under the 
sponsorship of MNCs. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, patents 
 
5
 The SIPO grants three types of patents: invention, utility model, and design patents. In principle, applications for 
invention patents need to pass a substantive examination for novelty and non-obviousness; the utility model and design 
patents do not. In this sense, a Chinese invention patent is similar to a U.S. utility patent. However, the degree to which 
Chinese patent examiners hold domestic applicants to the same standards of novelty and non-obviousness as U.S. or 
European patent examiners is open to question. We will discuss this issue in the latter part of this paper. 
6 Source: The State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C web site, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ghfzs/zltj/
gnwszzlsqzknb/2009/201001/t20100122_488402.html, retrieved August 14, 2010. 
7
  Danguy (2012) provides a purely descriptive overview of the frequency of international co-invention in an expansive 
sample of USPTO and EPO patents, and finds it to be relatively rare. 
8
  To the best of our knowledge, the first use of the term international co-invention was in Branstetter et al. (2008).   
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resulting from international co-invention and MNC sponsorship account for the 
majority of new U.S. patents granted to Indian or Chinese inventors in recent 
years.9 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
India and China’s patent increases also differ quite substantially from the 
innovation explosions in Taiwan and South Korea that preceded them. The 
breakdowns of U.S. patent grants to Taiwan-based inventors and South-Korea-
based inventors are provided in Figure 3. As can be seen, starting in the late 1980s 
and proceeding through the 1990s, both Taiwan and South Korea underwent a 
sharp transition from almost pure imitators to increasingly aggressive innovators. 
The speed of this transition is reminiscent of India and China’s more recent 
invention surges, but the composition of inventor teams is not. The Taiwanese and 
South Korean patent explosions were generated almost entirely by purely 
indigenous teams of inventors. The important role of foreign firms in India and 
China's invention explosions may help explain why they are occurring at an even 
earlier stage of economic development than did the invention surges in South 
Korea and Taiwan. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Patents granted by the Indian and Chinese national patent offices also bear 
witness to the importance of foreign firms. In China, foreigners account for more 
than 50% of the total number of invention patents granted by the SIPO over the 
1990–2008 period. In 2009, the number of domestic invention patents slightly 
exceeded foreign invention patents, yet foreign invention patents still had a share 
 
9
 This finding was first documented in Branstetter et al. (2008). 
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of 49%.10 In India, the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs & 
Trade Marks (CGPDTM) granted between 59–84% of patents to foreign 
applicants during the period from 2000–2001 to 2010–2011.11 
In the same way that USPTO patent data help trace the explosive growth 
of innovative activity in India and China, they also help put their current levels 
into perspective. In Figure 4, we look at patents granted to inventors based in 
eight different countries from 1996–2010, and it is clear that, in spite of the fact 
that China’s inventive output as measured by U.S. patents places it head and 
shoulders above India and other so-called BRICs economies of Russia and Brazil, 
China’s generation of patents still lags far behind that of the leading advanced 
industrial economies, and even behind that of the newly industrialized economies 
such as Taiwan and South Korea. Despite being among a population less than 
one-tenth that of China, or about one-tenth of India, Japanese inventors received 
13 times as many U.S. patent grants as those based in China in 2010. Taiwan’s 
national population is lower than that of the municipality of Chongqing in the 
Chinese interior, yet Taiwanese inventors received nearly three times as many 
patents as mainland Chinese inventors in 2010. India and China’s explosive 
growth in U.S. patents has come from a very low base, and these two countries 
have a long way to go before they can claim to be a vital part of the global 
innovation system. However, if China’s current international patenting growth 
rates persist, it will start to rival the patent output of Taiwan and South Korea 
within a few years. It will clearly take longer for India to reach Taiwan’s and 
South Korea’s current levels.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
10
 Source: The State Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C web site, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ghfzs/zltj/
gnwszzlsqzknb/2009/201001/t20100122_488402.html, retrieved on August 14, 2010. 
11
 Source: CGPDTM, Annual report 2010–11, http://ipindia.gov.in/main_text1.htm, retrieved on November 19, 2012. 
The authors made the calculation.  
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By either assuming or predicting that innovation occurs exclusively in “the 
North,” the Product Life Cycle theory (Vernon 1966) and its current variants 
(Krugman 1979; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Grossman and Helpman 1990) 
rule out the possibility of innovation in “the South.” This reflects the situation at a 
time when these theories have been established. R&D in developing countries at 
the time was sporadic, usually implemental in nature, and lacking real 
technological breakthroughs.  
However, this stylized pattern has begun to change since the mid-1990s. 
First, multinationals are doing an increasing amount of R&D in emerging 
economies, notably in India, China, and the leading nations in Eastern Europe 
(Zhao, 2006; Branstetter et al., 2008; Branstetter and Foley, 2010). This shift has 
occurred against a backdrop of rising globalization of R&D, more generally.  
Between 1999 and 2009, the R&D expenditure of all foreign affiliates of U.S. 
firms almost doubled (Barefoot and Mataloni, 2011).   However, in China, these 
expenditures more than doubled just between 2004 and 2010, and in India they 
grew by a factor of ten over the same period.12  Second, the nature of 
multinational R&D in emerging economies has changed from a pure adaptation of 
existing technologies to also including some cutting-edge R&D on  par with that 
undertaken in developed economies (UNCTAD 2005) . 
Some work has been done to address these changes. Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) provide a theoretical model of offshoring that also includes skill-
intensive tasks. Puga and Trefler (2010) investigated innovation in emerging 
markets in a theoretical context in which it was treated as mostly incremental. 
Zhao (2006) suggested that by using closely-knit internal technological structures 
as an alternative mechanism to protect their intellectual property in countries with 
weak IP legal environments, MNCs are increasingly conducting R&D in countries 
 
12
   See Yorgason (2007) and Barefoot (2012). 
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with less developed intellectual property rights systems, such as India and China. 
However, systematic study on this topic is still insufficient.  
MNCs’ leveraging their innovation competencies across borders per se is 
not a new phenomenon (Cantwell 1995; Kogut and Zander 1993), but using co-
invention as a vehicle to create novel innovations in emerging economies is. The 
clear importance of international co-invention in the data on U.S. patents granted 
to Indian and Chinese inventors may suggest something extremely interesting: the 
possibility that the R&D process itself can now be sliced into multiple stages, and 
countries may participate in different stages according to their competitive 
advantages. This phenomenon is often referred to as “vertical specialization” or 
“vertical disintegration” in the trade literature (Krugman, Cooper, and Srinivasan 
1995; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; Yi 2003).  
If India and China’s emergence in the global innovation system follows 
this economic canon, co-invention created in India and China is likely to be 
characterized by a division of labor in the research process. As such, Indian and 
Chinese researchers may undertake more repetitive, codified, and relatively 
routine research tasks while researchers in advanced countries may provide more 
sophisticated, creative, and high-level intellectual input. Combining the two, 
MNCs can produce a greater amount and more impactful innovative output with a 
given amount of R&D expenditure (Romer 1990). As a result, an increase in 
R&D activity induced in China and India through this process might not be a 
direct substitute for the higher level R&D inputs from the Western advanced 
countries, but rather a strong complement to it. However, this notion of 
complementarity could fade over time. Local Indian and Chinese inventors who 
initially collaborated with Western inventors through co-invention partnerships 
could acquire and accumulate high-level skills through this collaboration, and 
then engage in high-level, original inventive activity without the need for input 
from Western inventors. In this case, co-invention could, over time, lead to 
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greater direct substitution between Western and local invention. But, it is also 
possible that after acquiring and accumulating high-level skills, these local Indian 
and Chinese inventors would continue to collaborate with Western 
inventors(Kogut and Zander 1992; Weitzman 1998; Singh 2008). We will return 
to this issue in the later part of this paper. 
III. Data Sources and Trends 
Our analysis in this paper will focus primarily on U.S. patent grants as an 
indicator of inventive output. This is principally because prior research has 
established that the real economic value of most patents is extremely small (Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg 2002), but the more valuable patents tend to be patented not just 
in the home country but in other major markets as well.  Because India and China 
are developing countries with still-developing patent systems, a patent grant in 
India or China is less likely to represent an important advance over the global 
state of the art. However, the USPTO will apply the same standards to patent 
applications originating in India or China that it applies to patent applications 
originating in California. These U.S. patent grants are far more likely to be 
reflective of economically valuable new-to-the-world inventions than is an 
“invention” for which we find Indian or Chinese patent grants but no U.S. patent 
grants. Furthermore, significant changes in the domestic patent systems in India 
and China make Indian and Chinese patent data inconsistent over time.  
Our data come from several sources. The first is the Selected 
Bibliographic Information from US Patents DVD (2009 December) released by 
the USPTO, which contains bibliographic information for all granted patents from 
1969–2009.13 The second is the Disambiguation and Co-authorship Networks of 
 
13
 The information from this data source has been included in the Disambiguation and Co-authorship Networks of the 
U.S. Patent Inventor Database (Lai et al. 2011). However, when we began work this research project, the Disambiguation 
and Co-authorship Networks of the U.S. Patent Inventor Database had not come out. 
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the U.S. Patent Inventor Database (Lai et al. 2011), which contains bibliographic 
information for granted patents and citations data for patents granted during the 
period of 1975–2010.14 The third is the COMETS database 1.0 (Zucker and 
Darby 2011), which we used to verify and supplement citation data from the 
Disambiguation and Co-authorship Networks of the U.S. Patent Inventor 
Database. The fourth is the USPTO Patent Full-Text and Image Database 
(online), as well as the Patent Assignment Database (online), which we used to 
identify and verify some important information of our dataset. We dropped 
withdrawn patents from our datasets, updated patent classes to Current 
Classifications as of the end of 2010, and standardized the assignee codes and 
names according to the USPTO’s assignee harmonization system.15, 16, 17 
By combining the first three datasets, we identified and characterized 
3,983,050 utility patents granted from 1975 to 2010. We then used these patents 
to track citation relationships and counted the number of citations received (or 
“forward citations”) for each patent.  
For the purposes of our research, we separated Hong Kong and Taiwan 
from mainland China.18 A total of 12,419 patents are identified as those with at 
 
14
 In earlier versions of this paper, the citation data are extracted from the NBER Patent Data Project (PDP) citation file 
(1976 – 2006) downloaded from Professor Bronywn Hall’s website and the Patent Grant Bibliographic Data/XML Version 
4.2 ICE (Text Only) 2007, 2008 and 2009, downloaded from the USPTO website. These have been included in the 
Disambiguation and Co-authorship Networks of the U.S. Patent Inventor Database. 
15
 USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/withdrawn.jsp, retrieved January 24, 2012. 
16
 According to A Cassis2 DVD-ROM, Patents Class: Current Classifications of US Patents Issued 1790 to Present 
(2010 December). 
17
 In earlier versions of this paper, the harmonized assignee codes are extracted from the Selected Bibliographic 
Information from US Patents DVD (2009 December). We combined them with assignee codes for patents granted in 2010 
according to the files downloaded from the USPTO website. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/misc/
data_cd.doc/assignee_harmonization/, retrieved July 13, 2012. 
18
 One issue arises for the years after 1997, when the United Kingdom returned sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. 
Some inventors residing in Hong Kong continued to list Hong Kong as their inventor country; others began to list China as 
their inventor country. (Note: politically, Hong Kong has never been a country, but USPTO designates a separate country 
code to it for classification purposes.) Before and after 1997, we identify Hong Kong addresses and consider them to be 
geographically distinct from mainland China.  Similar mistakes can be found when a Taiwanese inventor listed Republic of 
China, the official name of Taiwan, as her home country. A small number of Taiwanese patents have been mistakenly 
classified with an inventor country code of “CN” (which stands for China) instead of “TW” (which stands for Taiwan) by 
the USPTO. We corrected these mistakes by looking up an inventor’s full address.  
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least one inventor residing in China at the time of invention during the period 
1981–2010.19 A total of 7,754 patents are identified as those with at least one 
inventor residing in India at the time of invention during the period 1975–2010.20 
The USPTO has classified all patents into the seven types of assignees:  
(i) Unassigned;  
(ii) Assigned to U.S. non-government organizations;  
(iii) Assigned to non-U.S. non-government organizations; 
(iv) Assigned to U.S. individuals; 
(v) Assigned to non-U.S. individuals; 
(vi) Assigned to the U.S. Federal Government; 
(vii) Assigned to non-U.S. Governments.  
However, we want to distinguish patents granted to a firm entity from 
those granted to a non-firm entity. To do so, we manually screened all first 
assignees’ information listed on patents, including original type code, name, 
address, etc., and consulted Dun & Bradstreet's Million Dollar Database, 
LexisNexis Corporate Affiliations, Hoover’s Online, and assignees’ websites to 
assign the proper assignee types for all China- and India-related assignees. After 
this procedure, we find that 78% of all 12,419 U.S. utility patents granted to 
Chinese inventors were assigned to a firm entity, 12% to an individual or 
identified as unassigned, 9% to universities and research institutes, and 1% to 
 
19
 The first China-based patent was granted to Dynapol, a chemical company in 1981. The patent counts are based on 
grant years. 
20
 Similar to what happened to the China-based data, in a few cases, Indonesia and the state of Indiana were mistakenly 
assigned with an inventor country code of “IN” (which stands for India). We corrected all of these mistakes.  
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other entities such as governments, hospitals, etc. For India-based patents , 74% 
of  total 7,754 U.S. utility patents were assigned to a firm entity, 5% to an 
individual or identified as unassigned, 20% to universities and research institutes, 
and 2% to other entities. It can be concluded that firms are the main contributors 
of the recent increase of U.S. patents in India and China.  
Who owns these patents? For India, U.S. MNCs own the majority of 
India-based U.S. patents. Of all 5,716 India-based patents assigned to a firm 
entity, 70% are assigned to U.S. MNCs, 18% are assigned to Indian indigenous 
firms, 3% are assigned to Germany (3%), and 3% are assigned to France-Italy.  
These patents are owned by a single firm, STMicroelectronics Pvt. Ltd., the 
Indian subsidiary of French-Italian multinational electronics and semiconductor 
manufacturer STMicroelectronics.  The remaining 5% is distributed among all 
other countries. For China, at the assignee nationality level, Taiwanese and U.S. 
MNCs own the majority of Chinese patents, even more than Chinese indigenous 
enterprises. Of all 9,744 China-based patents assigned to a firm entity, 36% are 
assigned to Taiwanese MNCs or their Chinese subsidiaries, 29% are assigned to 
U.S. MNCs, and 23% are assigned to Chinese indigenous firms. Other important 
nations and areas include Hong Kong, Germany, and Japan, which account for 
3%, 2%, and 2% respectively. The remainder as a whole accounts for 6%. 
At the firm level, Table 1 lists the top 10 firm assignees of India-generated 
U.S. patents. Among them, eight are U.S. MNCs and one is a French-Italian 
MNC. The only Indian indigenous firm in the list is Ranbaxy, one of the world’s 
top generic pharmaceutical companies. Table 2 lists the top 10 firm assignees of 
China-generated U.S. patents. Among them, Hon Hai, a Taiwanese manufacturing 
firm, also known by its English name Foxconn, leads the list. As the largest 
manufacturer of electronics and computer components worldwide, Hon Hai 
conducts intensive R&D in China and has 2,958 U.S. utility patents, or 30% of 
total China-based firm-owned U.S. patents. Microsoft, with 765 patents, or 8%, is 
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a distant second. The third is Huawei, an indigenous Chinese firm that has quickly 
become one of the leading networking and telecommunication equipment 
suppliers in the world.  
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
To measure what kinds of invention have been done in India and China, 
we aggregate all China- and India-based U.S. patents that are owned by a firm 
entity into the widely used technology categories created by Hall, Jaffe, & 
Trajtenberg (2001). We will refer to their taxonomy as the HJT categories. The 
results presented in Figure 5 show that, with regard to India-based patents, 
Computers & Communications is the leading field. India has been well-known for 
its software industry, so one question worth asking is: to what extent have 
software patents contribute to India’s U.S. patent surge? Among all India-based 
U.S. patent grants before 2007, about 10% are software patents. A large 
proportion of China-based patents taken out in the U.S. are in two HJT categories: 
Computers & Communications and Electrical & Electronic. During the same 
period, the share of China-based software patents is about 5%. It can also be seen 
in Figure 5 that co-invention plays an important role across all categories in both 
countries.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
By extracting the geographic information on inventors included in patent 
documents, we found that among the 20,088 inventor addresses that indicate the 
inventor was living in India, 20,045 addresses can be associated with a particular 
state in India.  Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi 
are the top five states/territories that host most Indian inventors. Together, they 
account for 76% of the frequency distribution of India inventor addresses. These 
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areas are also where Technology Business Incubators (TBIs), Science and 
Technology Entrepreneurs Parks (STEPs), Software Technology Parks of India 
(STPIs), universities and research institutions tend to concentrate (Sharma, 
Nookala, and Sharma 2012). 
We found 27,238 inventor addresses indicating that the inventor was 
located in China. 27,177 of these addresses were sufficiently complete that we 
could associate the address with a particular Chinese province.  We find that 
Chinese inventors are highly clustered in three areas: Beijing Municipality, 
Guangdong province, and the greater Shanghai regional economy, comprising 
Shanghai and the bordering provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Those areas 
account for 86% of the frequency distribution of Chinese inventor addresses. 
These areas are not only the most developed areas in China, but also the places 
where most multinational R&D centers are located.21  
All of the above features are based on the analysis of U.S. patent data, 
which have limitations as indicators of invention in India and China. The most 
obvious one is that U.S. patent data may exaggerate the roles of U.S. MNCs, since 
companies usually patent more in their home market than somewhere else. 
Moreover, although the U.S. is the largest national economy in the world and 
grants a large number of patents, patents granted by its patent office may still not 
be able to capture the whole picture of the rise of innovation in India and China. 
For these reasons, we have also analyzed European Patent Office (EPO) patent 
data as a robustness check. The major patterns revealed by U.S. patent data also 
hold using EPO data, including the importance of co-invention and MNC 
sponsorship, technological concentration in IT-related fields, and geographic 
clustering of Indian and Chinese inventors. It is worth pointing out that even EPO 
 
21
 As of the end of 2009, 465 of multinational R&D centers were established as independent legal entities with 
approval of the Ministry of Commerce of P.R.C. These centers are mainly concentrated in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Source: People’s Daily online, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90861/6921243.html, 
retrieved August 17, 2010. 
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data indicate that U.S. MNCs play a more important role than European MNCs in 
India-based patenting. This probably reflects the fact that U.S. MNCs are 
following more aggressive strategies of conducting R&D in India than are MNCs 
from other places. Figures and tables presenting the results using the EPO patent 
data are available upon request.  
Before moving on to the next section, we need to answer another 
important question:  to what extent can we base our inference about innovation in 
India and China on the relatively small number of U.S. patents, especially when 
there is a tidal wave of patents being issued in China itself (Hu and Jefferson, 
2009).  The numbers of Chinese domestic patents granted by China's State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) in the most recent years are mind-boggling. In 
2011 alone, SIPO issued nearly one million patents of various kinds. The majority 
of these grants go to indigenous/domestic applicants.  Is our focus on the 
international patents of Chinese inventors generating a distorted picture of the true 
innovation going on inside China? To answer this question, we have carefully 
examined Chinese invention patents, using SIPO micro data on Chinese grants 
over the 1985-2012 period. 
The first thing we want to point out is that the overwhelming majority of 
SIPO grants are actually utility models or design patents. These are not true 
patents, in the usual Western sense of the word.  Neither requires a substantive 
examination or a significant technical advance over the existing state-of-the-art. 
When we focus on China's so-called invention patents, which do require a 
substantive examination and, in principle, an advance over the existing technical 
state-of-the-art, we see significantly smaller numbers and significantly less 
growth. With this more restrictive definition, the total grant number drops by 
about 80% in recent years.  
Second, as of the end of 2012, about half of SIPO invention patents are 
granted to foreign applicants, and among these foreign-owned invention patents, 
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90% of them possess a foreign priority claim. That means more than 40% of 
Chinese invention patents are inventions initially created abroad and then patented 
in China.  Even this may understate the role of foreign inventors.  Patents granted 
to MNC Chinese subsidiaries and joint ventures in China are classified as 
domestic grants by the SIPO.  However, many of these patents are generated 
using intellectual inputs from outside China, including resources and capabilities 
located in the multinationals' R&D centers far beyond China's borders.  These 
considerations further limit the degree to which China's impressive headline 
patent numbers can be taken as evidence of globally significant innovative 
activity. 
Third, we find that domestic applicants allow their patents to expire earlier 
than foreign applicants by failing to pay maintenance fees over the full legal life 
of the patent.. This result is consistent with Huang (2012), who found similar 
results for invention patents initially applied for during the 1987–1989 period.  
This suggests that there is a quality difference between Chinese patents granted to 
foreign inventors and Chinese patents granted to domestic inventors.   
These concerns are strongly reinforced by the extremely low propensity 
for Chinese inventors, in the aggregate, to apply for and receive patent protection 
for their Chinese inventions in patent jurisdictions outside China.  For decades, 
researchers seeking to quantify innovation have used the fraction of domestic 
patents for which foreign patent protection is sought, and the number of foreign 
jurisdictions in which patent protection for a given invention is sought, as 
indicators of patent quality.  Even in advanced countries with mature patent 
systems, the need to file patent applications quickly in order to avoid being 
foreclosed by rival innovators means that firms often begin the patent application 
process, at least at home, at a very early stage in the R&D process, before even 
the inventors themselves have a clear sense of the ultimate economic value of the 
patent.  Under international patenting rules, firms have up to a year after the 
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domestic filing during which they can start the process of seeking patent 
protection in foreign jurisdictions, with the "priority date" established by their 
home patent application filing date.  We generally observe that firms are more 
selective in their foreign patenting, applying for the patent protection in major 
markets outside the home country only when the invention appears sufficiently 
important to merit the additional time and expense of multiple foreign patent 
filings.   
In the context of these considerations, it is interesting to observe that the 
top 100 U.S. patent applicants seek to protect nearly 30% of their domestic 
patents in at least one major foreign market, such as Japan or the EPO.   In 
striking contrast, we find that the top100 Chinese domestic applicants seek patent 
protection for less than 6% of their inventions in the U.S., only 4% in Europe, and 
only 1% in Japan.  If we look at the number of domestic patent grants for which 
Chinese firms pursue the patent application process all the way to the successful 
receipt of a foreign patent grant, the numbers are vanishingly small.  So far, fewer 
than 3% of Chinese invention patents have been successfully patented in any 
major market outside China, and fewer than 1% have been patented in 2 or more 
major markets. Even after decades of rapid growth, China is still a significantly 
smaller economy than the U.S. or Western Europe.  If Chinese inventors possess 
new-to-the-world technology, it would seem to be well worth their while to take 
out patents in these markets that are still larger, in aggregate terms, than China 
itself.  The fact that Chinese inventors forego the opportunity to do so for the 
overwhelming majority of their domestic patents appears to represent a striking 
vote of no confidence in the quality of their inventions.   
A more detailed discussion of the SIPO data and the unique features of the 
Chinese domestic patent system is beyond the scope of this paper, but a number 
of recent studies call into question the degree to which China's flood of domestic 
 20
patents really indicates a substantial degree of indigenous innovation.22  We note 
here two recent studies of special interest.  Lei et al. (2012) note widespread 
government subsidies for domestic patenting in China, but show that an increase 
in these subsidies appears to increase the number of patents but not the quantity of 
innovation.   Eberhardt et al. (2011) study domestic and foreign patenting by 
Chinese firms, and conclude that the only Chinese firms engaging in real 
innovation are  those also taking out significant numbers of patents outside China. 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Results 
A. Hypotheses 
In Section II, we argued that the R&D process itself can be sliced into 
multiple stages, and countries participate in different stages according to their 
comparative advantage (Krugman, Cooper, and Srinivasan 1995; Hummels, Ishii, 
and Yi 2001; Yi 2003). Previous research found that invention being generated in 
developing countries is incremental in nature (Zhao 2006; Puga and Trefler 2010). 
These findings suggest that Indian and Chinese researchers under the sponsorship 
of MNCs are likely to undertake low-end tasks, while Western researchers 
undertake high-end tasks. As such, we might expect that a comparison between 
Indian or Chinese invention with and without Western intellectual input would 
suggest that patents with Western intellectual input are of substantially higher 
quality than those without. The same considerations might suggest that even 
within the same MNC, patents with Indian or Chinese input might be of lower 
quality than the patent output of all-Western inventor teams.  Interviews with 
 
22
   Hu and Jefferson (2009), who undertook an early quantitative study of the impressive increase in China's domestic 
patenting, suggested that it was primarily driven by an increase in the propensity to patent rather than an increase in real 
innovative effort. 
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India-based R&D personnel and managers suggest that R&D in India largely 
follows this pattern.    
We will seek to validate that perception by measuring the relative quality 
of India-based USPTO patents in multiple ways. First, we will compare co-
invention generated in India with patents created by purely domestic researcher 
teams, and compare inventions created by MNCs with those generated by 
indigenous enterprises. The traditional theory of “vertical specialization” would 
suggest our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Co-invention and MNC sponsorship are associated 
with relatively higher patent quality.  
We then compare the quality of the patents MNC generated in India (both 
co-invention and purely domestic patents) with the patents the same MNCs 
produced in their home countries (with all inventors residing in the MNC’s home 
country). A view based on traditional theory would suggest our second 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Patents produced by MNCs in emerging economies 
are of lower quality than those produced by the same MNCs in their home 
countries, and even co-invented patents generated in emerging economies are of 
marginally lower quality.  
Besides overall comparisons, we also want to assess the dynamics of the 
patent quality across different patent categories.  Conversations with multinational 
R&D managers suggest that it takes time for talented researchers in emerging 
economies to become “mature.” This implies our next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The quality gap between patents (including co-
invention) produced by MNCs in India and patents produced by the same MNCs 
in their home countries is declining as MNCs gain more experience of doing R&D 
in India. 
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We have pointed out the possibility that international co-invention could 
accelerate the advancement of indigenous innovative capability. After a period of 
time working under the tutelage of multinationals, talented Indian engineers could 
put their skills and experience to work for indigenous firms that increasingly 
compete directly with the MNCs.  It will therefore be important to see if anything, 
about the degree to which gaps in innovative capacity between indigenous R&D 
efforts and those of the multinationals are closing over time.  
At this stage, however, it is difficult to capture such a dynamic process. 
There is no clear turning point in our dataset at which we could usefully divide 
the data into an “early period” with limited catch-up and a later period with more 
complete convergence of innovative capacity. This stems in part from the fact that 
some multinationals entered the Indian market early and began building strong 
R&D operations ten and more years ago, whereas other multinationals have only 
begun to establish their research capacity much more recently. It may be that early 
entrants have not only incubated a strong team of local engineers within their labs, 
but also seeded a number of local spin-off entrants with seasoned R&D personnel. 
But the innovative performance of these veterans of MNC R&D activity is diluted 
by an inflow of newly graduated and relatively inexperienced local Indian 
researchers. The ideal way to measure convergence thus would be to compare 
MNC-employed engineers and engineers employed in indigenous firms who are 
at the same stage in their inventive careers. This requires the tracking of 
individual inventors over time. This will be the focus of future research, but we 
will not attempt such a fine-grained comparison in this paper. Instead, we will 
arbitrarily divide the data into three periods to see if there is evidence of a 
declining gap in relative invention quality between indigenous enterprises and 
MNCs over time. Specifically, this leads us to our last hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The gap in patent quality between indigenous 
enterprises and MNCs is declining over time. 
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Throughout this section of the paper, our focus will be on MNC R&D in 
India.  In ongoing research, however, we are conducting a similar empirical 
investigation of MNC R&D in China, and, in the sections below, we will offer a 
qualitative comparison of our results for India with those we obtain when running 
similar regressions on a Chinese data set.   
B.  Empirical Model 
As already noted, we regard patent citations as an indicator of patent 
quality. Patent citations serve an important legal function because they delimit the 
scope of the property rights awarded by the patent. Thus, if patent B cites patent 
A, it implies that patent A represents a piece of previously existing knowledge 
upon which patent B builds, and over which B cannot have a claim (Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg 2001). Alcácer & Gittelman (2006) showed that patent citations 
are an imperfect measure of knowledge spillovers between inventors because 
examiners add a significant fraction of the citations after the initial patent 
application. It is obviously problematic to consider these examiner-added citations 
as reflecting the sources of inspiration of the inventor herself. However, we use 
citations as an indicator of patent quality rather than a measurement of knowledge 
spillover. Prior literature has shown that total citations received are highly 
correlated with the underlying quality of the invention (Trajtenberg 1990; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Fogarty 2000; Harhoff et al. 1999; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
2005). More valuable invention is more frequently cited by subsequently granted 
patents. Thus citations received can be used to proxy for the quality of each 
patent.  
Two issues arise when using patent citations as a measure of patent 
quality: truncation due to time and difference due to technological fields. Prior 
research has demonstrated that it takes time for patent citations to occur (Hall, 
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Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001). The number of citations made to a patent granted 
just one year ago may be only a small fraction of citations that will occur over the 
following fifteen years. It is easy to see that patents of different vintages are 
subject to different degrees of “citation truncation” (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
2001) as one cannot simply tell that a patent from 2005 with 25 citations is better 
or worse than a 2008 patent with only 10 citations. Similarly, one cannot tell that 
an electronic device patent granted in 2000 with 25 citations is better or worse 
than a pesticide patent granted in the same year with only 5 citations. To address 
the issue of truncation, we will control for patent grant years and use count 
models with “exposure” (Cameron and Trivedi 1998) in all regressions. To 
address the issue of technological difference, we control for major technological 
fields in our empirical analysis. 
Our basic model regresses the citations a patent has received on a number 
of control variables. These variables include a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not it was a product of international co-invention, a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not it was produced under multinational sponsorship, etc. A 
significantly positive coefficient on a control variable of interest indicates a 
higher number of citations received and suggests a higher quality of the patent. 
We apply the Poisson Quasi Maximum Likelihood (PQML) estimation to 
our regressions for two reasons. First, patent citations are integer counts and have 
a minimum value of zero. This is the definition of a count variable. Second, our 
data are overdispersed and the PQML estimator is consistent under the weaker 
assumption of the correct conditional mean specification and no restriction on the 
conditional variance (Wooldridge 1999; Wooldridge 2002; Cameron and Trivedi 
2005; Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984; Hall, Griliches, and Hausman 
1986). While a Negative Binomial (NB) mode can also deal with the 
“overdispersion” issue, it assumes that the conditional variance has a gamma 
distribution. The tradeoff between the NB model and the PQML model is 
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obvious: if the gamma assumption about the conditional variance is correct, then 
the NB estimator will be more efficient, but if the gamma assumption does not 
hold, then the NB estimator will be biased. Overall, the PQML model is more 
likely to result in lower significance levels than the NB model. Thus, we tend to 
regard the PQML model as preferable. However, we also run regressions using 
the NB model as a robustness check. The NB estimation results are qualitatively 
consistent with the PQML results presented in this paper and are available upon 
request. PQML estimators can be obtained by estimating an unconditional 
Poisson model with robust standard errors (Wooldridge 1999; Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005). 
Our dependent variable Y is the number of citations a patent has received, 
a quantity also referred to in literature as the count of “forward citations.” We 
count the cumulative number of citations a patent has received as of the end of 
2010, when our current citation dataset ends. We drop the patents granted in 2010 
in order to get at least one year of citation counts for the patents used in regression 
analysis.  
We exclude self citations in the citation counts. We do this because we are 
concerned that an inventor working in the Indian R&D subsidiaries of a 
multinational might have a higher propensity to cite her own or her colleagues’ 
patents than an inventor working in the MNC’s home country or somewhere else. 
This problem is exacerbated by the very rapid growth of India-based U.S. patents 
in recent years. In addition,, Zhao (2006) has suggested that patents created in a 
developing country and resulting from multinational sponsorship are subject to 
more self citations than those created in advanced countries due to MNCs’ 
internal IP protection arrangements. Based on these considerations, we regard the 
number of citations a patent receives, excluding self citations, as a better indicator 
of the “true” quality than those including self citations.  
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C.  Cross-firm within-country Comparisons 
To test H1, we run regressions on our India-based patent sample, 
including all USPTO patents that are granted to Indian inventors by the end of 
2009 and assigned to a firm entity. Our regressions take the following form: 
EሺC୧ሻ ൌ PatAge ∙ exp	ሺα଴ ൅ αଵCoinv୧ ൅ αଶMNC୧ ൅ αଷPatStock୤ ൅
αସTeamSize୧ ൅ αହGdelay୧ ൅ H୧ ൅ T୧ሻ		
where C is the total number of non-self citations an Indian-based patent i receives 
by the end of 2010. The key coefficients of interest are those on Coinv and 
MNC, which are dummy variables indicating whether or not a patent is co-
invented and whether or not it is assigned to a multinational assignee. The key 
task here is to compare co-invented and MNC-owned patents generated India with 
patents generated by Indian indigenous firms. In addition, we also control for 
other factors that may influence citations. PatStock denotes the assignee ݂’s three-
year patent stock before the date of application. We used PatStock as a proxy for a 
company’s inventive productivity at the time of patent creation. TeamSize is the 
total number of inventors on the patent. If larger teams are required for more 
"fundamental" (and potentially more valuable) inventions (Jones, 2006), and 
larger teams are more likely to be international teams, then this could introduce a 
mechanical positive association between co-invention and quality -- the TeamSize 
variable helps us control for this.  ܩ݈݀݁ܽݕ is the year delay between the patent’s 
application date and grant date. As mentioned earlier, forward citations are 
truncated in a sense that recently granted patents have less time to garner citations 
than earlier ones. To correct this, we estimate the PQML mode with “exposure” 
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998). ܲܽݐܣ݃݁ is the age of the patent, which serves as the 
exposure variable and is calculated as the days between the application date and 
the end of 2010. Thus the natural log of ܲܽݐܣ݃݁ enters as an offset in the 
(1) 
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conditional mean. “Exposure” assumes that the likelihood of events is not 
changing over time. However, this may not be true, so we also include grant year 
fixed effects T and HJT subcategory fixed effects.  
Table 3 shows the results. Column 1 includes a co-invention dummy; 
Column 2 includes a MNC assignee dummy; Column 3 includes both dummies. 
Across all three specifications, the coefficients on the co-invention dummy and 
the MNC assignee dummy are positive and significant. The coefficient of 0.239 in 
Column 1 can be interpreted that co-invented patents receive 27% (exp(0.239)-1) 
more non-self forward citations than purely Indian generated patents. Similarly, 
Column 2 suggests that MNC-sponsored patents—with a multinational 
assignee—receive 45% more citations than ones under the sponsorship of Indian 
indigenous enterprises, whether they are co-invented or not. It turns out that 
almost all co-invention in India is found in MNC-sponsored patents, so we cannot 
estimate much of a separate coefficient for the MNC assignee dummy when we 
also control for co-invention dummy in Column 3. The two dummies are highly 
collinear. It is also notable that team size has a positive and significant effect on 
patent quality.  
We acknowledge that the biases and issues that beset patent citation data 
may especially complicate quality comparisons between indigenous patenting and 
MNC patenting, so we want to proceed with caution. But the data do suggest that 
co-invented and MNC-sponsored patents are more technologically sophisticated 
and valuable than indigenous patents, as well as more numerous.  Running similar 
regressions on a parallel  China-based patent data set yields similar results.  With 
China-based patent data, it is possible to separately estimate multinational 
sponsorship and international co-invention effects.  Both are positive, statistically 
significant, and collectively point to a multinational patent premium that is 
roughly the same magnitude as what is observed in India. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
D. Cross-border Comparisons within MNCs 
Next, we want to know whether patents produced by MNCs in India are of 
lower quality than those produced by the same MNCs in their home countries 
(H2). To do so, we keep only those India-based U.S. patents that are assigned to 
(owned by) MNCs from 1996–2009. We then match them to the patents that are 
created by inventors in the MNCs’ home countries, with the same firm assignee 
code, three-digit technological class and grant year. Patents without a match are 
dropped. We drop patents granted in years before 1996 to ensure that we have a 
reasonable number of Indian domestic patents for comparison. Undertaking the 
same matching procedure as described above, we construct a second sample that 
only includes MNCs with more than 30 India-based patents by the end of 2010. 
Our specification is as follows: 
EሺC୧ሻ ൌ PatAge ∙ exp	ሺβ଴ ൅ βଵCoinv୧ ൅ βଶDomestic୧ ൅ βଷPatStock୤ ൅
βସTeamSize୧ ൅ βହGdelay୧ ൅ F୧ ൅ H୧ ൅ T୧	
 
where Coinv is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an MNC-sponsored 
patent is co-invented. ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an 
MNC-sponsored patent is generated exclusively by domestic inventor teams in 
India. Since we compare patents within the boundaries of the MNC, we also 
include ܨ௜, which denotes assignee (firm) fixed effects. All other variables are 
defined as in specification (1).  
We also want to investigate the dynamics of the quality difference 
between patents produced by MNCs in India and those produced by the same 
MNCs in their home countries over time (H3). Using the basic specification as in 
(2), we interact Coinv and ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ dummies with period dummies that are 
(2) 
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based on the length of a firm’s experience generating USPTO patents through the 
work of India-based inventors when the patent application was filed. We divide 
our data into three periods: 1–5 years of India experience, 6–10 years of India 
experience, and more than 10 years of India experience.  
Results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 shows that patents 
generated by MNCs in India appear to get systematically fewer non-self citations 
than those generated at home. In most cases, the differences are statistically 
significant at the standard levels. With regard to the dynamics of the quality 
difference, the point estimates for interaction terms in Table 5are all negative. 
Statistically significant negative quality differences fade for co-invented patents, 
but not for those with purely Indian inventor teams. Depending on how one looks 
at it, one can see limited evidence of a relative quality improvement over time for 
co-inventions in India, but the results are still quite weak. These results are 
consistent with a division of labor between Indian R&D personnel and Western 
R&D personnel within the boundaries of MNC in which much of the more 
fundamental, more frequently cited work is disproportionately likely to be 
conducted on the Western side. 
Interestingly, similar regression analyses on Chinese data reveal a 
different pattern.  There is no statistically significant difference in quality between 
China-generated multinational invention and invention generated in the 
multinational's home country.  Efforts to track the evolution of quality differences 
over time, as in Table 5, suggest that, in the case of China, there has been rapid 
relative improvement in the measured quality of the MNC invention conducted in 
China.  Understanding the differences in the Indian results reported here and the 
results obtained from our Chinese data is the focus of ongoing research. 
[Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here] 
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E. The Dynamics of the Quality Gap between MNCs and Indigenous Firms 
Is the quality difference between MNCs and indigenous firms narrowing 
over time? (H4) We can examine this by dividing the patents used for 
specification (1) into time periods according to their grant year and interacting our 
ܥ݋݅݊ݒ and ܯܰܥ dummies with these period dummies. We arbitrarily divide our 
data into three periods: grant years before 2000, grant years from 2000–2004, and 
grant years from 2005–2009.  
We specify the regressions as follows: 
EሺC୧ሻ ൌ PatAge ∙ exp	ሺφ଴ ൅ φଵCoinv୧ ∗ Gyearழଶ଴଴଴ ൅ φଶCoinv୧ ∗
Gyearଶ଴଴଴ିଶ଴଴ସ ൅ φଷCoinv୧ ∗ Gyearଶ଴଴ହିଶ଴଴ଽ ൅	φସMNC୧ ∗ Gyearழଶ଴଴଴ ൅
φହMNC୧ ∗ Gyearଶ଴଴଴ିଶ଴଴ସ ൅ φ଺MNC୧ ∗ Gyearଶ଴଴ହିଶ଴଴ଽ ൅ φ଻PatStock୤ ൅
φ଼TeamSize୧ ൅ φଽGdelay୧ ൅ H୧ ൅ T୧	 
Results from this regression specification are given in Table 6.  These 
results suggest that the quality premia associated with co-invention and with 
MNC sponsorship do not appear to be fading over time in India.  Instead, both 
remain economically and statistically significant. When we run a parallel 
regression on our Chinese dataset, we find evidence suggesting that the quality 
premium associated with international co-invention appears to fade over time, but 
the quality premium associated with multinational sponsorship remains strong, 
both in magnitude and in statistical significance.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
(3) 
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V. Peering inside Co-invention: Lessons from Interviews of Multinational 
R&D Personnel 
To obtain insights into the mechanisms behind the multinational R&D 
phenomenon in emerging economies, we took a research trip to China in 
December 2009 to conduct face-to-face interviews with inventors from 
multinational R&D centers there. We supplemented these interviews with 
telephone-based interviews of multinational R&D managers in India, and one 
member of the research team also participated in on-site interviews in Delhi, 
Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Bangalore.  Our interviews focused on several aspects 
of multinational R&D activity: How are the international research teams formed? 
What do the backgrounds of Indian or Chinese participants look like? Where do 
the main ideas in collaborative work come from? How do team members 
communicate? Does a division of labor exist within international research teams, 
and if so, to what extent?  
We received strong confirmation from all sources that there is an 
emerging international division of R&D labor within multinational firms, and that 
a significant fraction of their India-based and China-based research manpower is 
being used to contribute to global research projects whose ultimate application 
will be in global markets, not just the local market. Most interviewees emphasized 
their commitment to a long-run research presence that could engage the  large and 
growing endowment of engineering human resources in the local labor market in 
the service of their firm’s global R&D agenda.  
Second, we also received confirmation of the view that while the 
endowment of raw talent in China and India is immense and impressive, these 
talent pools  still contain relatively few individuals who have become capable of 
directing a world-class R&D effort in key areas of technology without many years 
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of exposure to multinational best practice.23 That being said, talented local 
engineers can and do become “mature” and effective collaborators in international 
R&D projects, even taking on leading roles, after a few years of intense 
experience within a multinational R&D lab. In some organizations, it was 
explicitly acknowledged that the fundamental intellectual insights and the 
structuring of the research agenda still came from the foreign side. In others 
organizations, there was much more local autonomy in terms of setting the 
research agenda. But even in these, expatriate R&D managers and/or local staff 
with extensive educational and work experience in the United States often 
maintained a key role in directing the R&D activities of younger staff whose 
education and experience had been obtained entirely in the local market.  
Nevertheless, a simple story of collaboration in which U.S.-based 
engineers come up with the ideas and give the orders and local engineers carry 
them out was clearly far too simple to reflect the much more complex patterns of 
interaction we heard described in our interviews. There were certainly cases in 
which important ideas came in the first instance from the local side, as well as 
cases in which the projects were conceived, developed, and implemented entirely 
by the local side, with very little Western input.   
Many interviewees placed far more stress on the importance of 
“(re)engineering products for the local market” as a source of co-invention than 
we initially expected. In many markets for industrial intermediate goods—and 
even in some markets for consumer goods—the Chinese market is now 
substantially larger than the U.S. market or even the European market.  India now 
has more cellular phone subscribers than the United States has citizens.   
 
23
   We are drawing a sharp distinction here between "indigenous" local personnel who are educated in India or China 
and spend their entire professional lives there, and "multinational" personnel with Western educations and long-term work 
experience in the West, who may nevertheless have an Indian or Chinese ethnic background.  The statement about 
managerial capability applies to the former, most definitely not to the latter.  Interestingly, these judgments were often 
rendered by multinational managers who had the same ethnic background as their "local" employees. 
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However, India and China are still both poor, developing countries, and the 
tradeoff between cost and functionality is quite different for a local customer—
even a local corporate customer—than it is for a Western customer. Therefore, a 
significant fraction of local engineering personnel were employed in the ongoing 
process of reengineering Western products for the local market—in ways that 
were both subtle and profound.  This activity was taking place in both China and 
India, but the tone of the interviews suggested a significantly greater intensity of 
this effort in China.  In the context of this reengineering work, it is not surprising 
that local engineers often take a leading role. However, the division between 
“reengineering for the local market” and “contributing to the global R&D agenda” 
was a fuzzy one and, over time, the same local engineer might be involved in both 
kinds of undertakings. In fact, interviewees noted that some cost-reducing 
innovations are often applied to products in other developing markets around the 
world and sometimes to even Western products and processes. For these reasons, 
reengineering projects could generate co-invented U.S. patents.  
Finally, our interviewees generally confirmed both the communications 
challenges posed by intercontinental research collaboration and the role of 
modern telecommunications technologies in meeting these challenges. 
Videoconferencing and software design tools that allowed a globally distributed 
team to work with the same virtual prototypes were important mechanisms 
facilitating research collaboration. R&D engineers noted that videoconferences 
with collaborators around the world were now a routine practice in most projects. 
It was also seen as important for the firms to ensure a steady flow of personnel 
between the various global R&D centers. Face-to-face communications helped 
provide a foundation of basic understanding and trust that later internet-mediated 
interaction could build on. Most interviewers agreed that, without modern 
communications tools, this kind of globally distributed R&D effort would be 
impossible.  
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VI. Conclusions and Implications 
In this paper, we have analyzed the patterns found in India- and China-
based U.S. patents. In doing so, we found that a majority of India’s U.S. patents 
are owned by foreign MNCs, with U.S. firms playing an especially important role.  
Similarly, a majority of China’s U.S. patents are owned by non-Chinese MNCs, 
with Taiwanese and U.S. firms playing a significant  role. We have shown that 
China- and India-based U.S patents are technologically concentrated in IT-related 
fields. We suspect that the prevalence of software-based design and engineering 
tools in these domains might have facilitated co-invention and long distance R&D 
efforts. We explored the geographic distribution of Indian and Chinese inventors 
and found that the majority of Indian and Chinese inventors are clustered in  the 
most economically advanced regions in both countries, where FDI is also 
concentrated.  
We complemented statistical analyses of the patent data with in-person 
interviews with researchers in multinational R&D subsidiaries. These interviews 
confirmed that India- and China- R&D personnel are increasingly seen as an 
integral part of MNCs’ global R&D operations, and they are increasingly 
contributing to innovations whose ultimate market targets are outside of China 
and India. However, the patterns of international collaboration within MNCs are 
more complex than those that arise directly out of traditional views of 
comparative advantage. Our interviews supported the view that modern advances 
in telecommunications technologies have been instrumental in facilitating 
international R&D collaborations.  
We have used  forward citations from patent documents to compare the 
quality of India-based patents in multiple ways. Our results support our R&D 
 35
vertical disintegration argument.  Our study suggests that the increase in U.S. 
patents in India and China are to a great extent driven by MNCs from advanced 
economies and are highly dependent on collaborations with inventors in those 
advanced economies. As such, India and China’s striking rise in innovation may 
represent less of a challenge to conventional views of development economics. 
The view that the rise of innovation in India and China is undermining the 
traditional position of technological leadership enjoyed by the U.S. and other 
advanced industrial economies has been exaggerated.  
Nevertheless, the world of R&D is indeed undergoing a major change. 
The increase in R&D activity in emerging economies such as India and China 
represents a growing international division of R&D labor. By undertaking R&D 
in emerging economies, MNCs can now provide innovative technologies to global 
markets at a lower cost and introduce products more suitable for emerging 
markets.  
All of this leads us to the possibility of a "win-win" outcome for a more 
integrated global innovation system that can benefit both emerging and advanced 
economies. By participating in MNCs’ R&D networks, emerging economies not 
only bring in more investment and create more employment, they can also 
participate in the generation of new technology at an earlier stage in the economic 
development process, even before they have internally developed all of the 
necessary categories of capabilities required for the complete R&D process.  
Their participation can also shift the direction of global R&D in a way that creates 
more goods and services suited to the income levels and conditions of emerging 
markets. Jones (2009) suggests diminishing productivity in R&D investment in 
the traditional innovation centers of the West as the “burden of knowledge” rises, 
but this can be offset by adding enough new scientists into a globalized 
innovation process, generating gains at the global level. By letting their 
companies do R&D in countries like India and China, advanced economies will 
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also benefit from a faster pace of innovation and a more rapidly expanding stock 
of knowledge.  
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FIGURE 1: THE RISE OF CO-INVENTED AND MNC-SPONSORED USPTO PATENTS IN INDIA 
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FIGURE 2: THE RISE OF CO-INVENTED AND MNC-SPONSORED USPTO PATENTS IN CHINA 
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FIGURE 3: PATTERNS OF USPTO PATENTING FROM SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN 
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FIGURE 4: INDIA- AND CHINA-BASED USPTO PATENTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 1: Top 10 firm assignees of India-based USPTO patents 
Rank Assignee Name Nationality Number Percentage 
1 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY U.S. 464 8.12% 
2 IBM U.S. 450 7.87% 
3 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INCORPORATED U.S. 418 7.31% 
4 CISCO TECHNOLOGY, INC. U.S. 162 2.83% 
5 INTEL CORPORATION U.S. 151 2.64% 
6 STMICROELECTRONICS PVT. LTD.* France & Italy 151 2.64% 
7 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. U.S. 126 2.20% 
8 SYMANTEC OPERATING CORPORATION U.S. 116 2.03% 
9 RANBAXY LABORATORIES LIMITED India 102 1.78% 
10 MICROSOFT CORPORATION U.S. 96 1.68% 
* STMICROELECTRONICS PVT. LTD. is the Indian subsidiary of STMicroelectronics, a French-Italian 
multinational electronics and semiconductor manufacturer. 
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TABLE 2: TOP 10 FIRM ASSIGNEES OF CHINA-BASED USPTO PATENTS 
Rank Assignee Name Nationality Number Share 
1 HON HAI PRECISION IND. CO., LTD.* Taiwan 2,958 30.36% 
2 MICROSOFT CORPORATION U.S. 765 7.85% 
3 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. China 430 4.41% 
4 INTEL CORPORATION U.S. 197 2.02% 
5 INVENTEC CORPORATION*** Taiwan 177 1.82% 
6 CHINA PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION (SINOPEC)** China 173 1.78% 
7 SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING INTERNATIONAL (SHANGHAI) CORPORATION China 139 1.43% 
8 IBM U.S. 129 1.32% 
9 SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.**** Hong Kong/Japan 128 1.31% 
10 METROLOGIC INSTRUMENTS INC. U.S. 92 0.94% 
* Figure here represents the sum of patents taken out under HON HAI (FOXCONN) and its China-based 
subsidiaries. 
** The original dataset confused CHINA PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION (SINOPEC), a Chinese 
company, with CHINA PETROCHEMICAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CPDC), a Taiwanese 
company. The figure presented here is after correction. 
*** Figure here represents the sum of patents taken out under INVENTEC CORPORATION, INVENTEC 
APPLIANCE and INVENTEC ELECTRONICS (NANJING) CO.. 
**** SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD. is a wholly owned subsidiary of TDK, a Japanese multinational 
electronics manufacturer. However, SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD. itself has manufacturing branches in 
mainland China. For our research purpose, we will treat it as a Hong Kong firm in our analysis. 
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FIGURE 5: FIRM-OWNED CHINA- AND INDIA-BASED USPTO PATENTS ACROSS HJT TECHNOLOGY CATEGORIES 
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TABLE 3: CROSS-FIRM COMPARISON WITHIN INDIA (1979-2009) 
DV: # of non-self citations 
received as of the end of 2010 
(1) (2) (3) 
Control for co-
invention 
Control for assignee 
type 
Control for Both 
    
Indian co-invention 0.239** 
(0.0851) 
 
 
0.171* 
(0.0806) 
    
Multinational assignee  
 
0.375** 
(0.144) 
0.264 
(0.138) 
    
3-year patent stock prior to 
application date (in thousands) 
0.00760 
(0.0119) 
-0.000294 
(0.0121) 
0.00358 
(0.0122) 
    
Grant delay in years 0.123*** 
(0.0282) 
0.132*** 
(0.0285) 
0.127*** 
(0.0281) 
    
Team size 0.0465*** 
(0.00615) 
0.0526*** 
(0.00566) 
0.0479*** 
(0.00603) 
    
Constant -8.643*** 
(0.586) 
-8.817*** 
(0.578) 
-8.793*** 
(0.577) 
    
Grant year dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
HJT subcat dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4280 4280 4280 
Offset ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) 
Log pseudolikelihood -13541.4 -13545.0 -13512.2 
Chi-square 2037.3 2087.0 2051.7 
Pro>chi-square 0 0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 4: CROSS-BORDER COMPARISONS WITHIN MNCS (INDIA, 1996-2009) 
DV: # of non-self citations received as of the end of 
2010 
(1) (2) 
Full sample Firms with >30 IN patents 
   
Indian co-invention -0.212*** 
(0.0613) 
-0.182* 
(0.0895) 
   
Purely Indian invention -0.229* 
(0.109) 
-0.189 
(0.113) 
   
3-year patent stock prior to application date (in 
thousands) 
-0.00344 
(0.0180) 
0.00461 
(0.0232) 
   
Grant delay in years 0.101*** 
(0.0130) 
0.115*** 
(0.0138) 
   
Team size 0.0626*** 
(0.00490) 
0.0638*** 
(0.00556) 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Grant year dummy Yes Yes 
HJT subcat dummy  Yes Yes 
Observations 40324 32633 
Offset ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) 
Number of firms 234 21 
Log pseudolikelihood -142502.3 -116929.6 
Chi-square 8.45260e+11 5.53888e+10 
Pro>chi-square 0 0 
Robust standard errors clustered by the MNC in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
 52
TABLE 5: CROSS-BORDER COMPARISONS WITHIN MNCS OVER TIME (INDIA, 1996-2009) 
DV: # of non-self citations received as of the end of 
2010 
(1) (2) 
Full sample Firms with >30 IN patents 
   
Co-invention*1-5 years of India experience -0.298*** 
(0.0652) 
-0.339*** 
(0.1000) 
   
Co-invention*6-10 years of India experience -0.0971 
(0.169) 
-0.0768 
(0.164) 
   
Co-invention*More than 10 years of India experience -0.120 
(0.145) 
-0.153 
(0.155) 
   
Purely Indian Invention*1-5 years of India experience -0.312* 
(0.123) 
-0.287* 
(0.144) 
   
Purely Indian Invention*6-10 years of India experience -0.1000 
(0.116) 
-0.0761 
(0.104) 
   
Purely Indian Invention*More than 10 years of India 
experience 
-0.370*** 
(0.0699) 
-0.321*** 
(0.0795) 
   
3-year patent stock prior to application date (in 
thousands) 
-0.00445 
(0.0175) 
0.00302 
(0.0226) 
   
Grant delay in years 0.101*** 
(0.0129) 
0.115*** 
(0.0138) 
   
Team size 0.0629*** 
(0.00489) 
0.0645*** 
(0.00531) 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Grant year dummy Yes Yes 
HJT subcat dummy  Yes Yes 
Observations 40324 32633 
Offset ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) 
Number of firms 234 21 
Log pseudolikelihood -142463.8 -116898.3 
Chi-square 8.82700e+11 4.73898e+10 
Pro>chi-square 0 0 
Robust standard errors clustered by the MNC in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 6: CROSS-FIRM COMPARISON WITHIN INDIA OVER TIME (1979-2009) 
DV: # of non-self citations 
received as of the end of 2010 
(1) (2) (3) 
Control for co-
invention 
Control for assignee 
type 
Control for Both 
    
Co-invention*Grant year < 
2000 
0.327 
(0.206) 
 
 
0.277 
(0.212) 
    
Co-invention*Grant year 2000-
2004 
0.109 
(0.106) 
 
 
0.0476 
(0.118) 
    
Co-invention*Grant year 2005-
2009 
0.332*** 
(0.0918) 
 
 
0.252** 
(0.0939) 
    
Multinational assignee*Grant 
year < 2000 
 
 
0.351 
(0.250) 
0.163 
(0.247) 
    
Multinational assignee*Grant 
year 2000-2004 
 
 
0.265 
(0.136) 
0.233 
(0.154) 
    
Multinational assignee*Grant 
year 2005-2009 
 
 
0.743*** 
(0.151) 
0.614*** 
(0.155) 
    
3-year patent stock prior to 
application date (in thousands) 
0.00766 
(0.0119) 
-0.000550 
(0.0121) 
0.00283 
(0.0123) 
    
Grant delay in years 0.124*** 
(0.0287) 
0.134*** 
(0.0288) 
0.129*** 
(0.0287) 
    
Team size 0.0463*** 
(0.00605) 
0.0523*** 
(0.00564) 
0.0475*** 
(0.00598) 
    
Constant -8.672*** 
(0.588) 
-8.802*** 
(0.598) 
-8.773*** 
(0.595) 
    
Grant year dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
HJT subcat dummy  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4280 4280 4280 
Offset ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) ln(pat_age) 
Log pseudolikelihood -13523.2 -13529.2 -13480.0 
Chi-square 1973.3 2319.3 2209.9 
Pro>chi-square 0 0 0 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00 
 
 
